Anti-Natalism: Rejectionist Philosophy from Buddhism to Benatar, by Ramesh Mishri (aka Ken Coates)
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Ramesh Mishri â Emeritus Professor of Social Policy and a Senior Scholar at York University in Toronto â originally published this as an ebook in 2014 under the nom de plume âKen Coatesâ. However, shortly before he died, he gave permission to reveal his identity in preparation for a paperback edition.
The work traces the history of ârejectionistâ philosophy â i.e., the anti-existential viewpoint that finds life inherently and deeply flawed.
It begins by looking at classical Hinduism (i.e., Brahmanism), and especially the rejectionist statements contained within the Vedas and the Upanishads, e.g. âthe human body is fair in appearance only; in truth it is no more than a conglomerate of foul-smelling impuritiesâ; and the soul is âfouler stillâ, containing âdesire, anger, covetousness, delusion, fear, depression, envy.â Humans suffer from âhunger, thirst, old age, death, disease, and sorrowâ. Above all, it is the âsenseless and endless prolongation of life through ever recurring births and deaths â due to the transmigration of souls â that is considered as the evil from which liberation is sought.â The Upanishads taught that âall things are vanity, and only man is fool enough to desire them. He thirsts for life and the fullness of it, not knowing that is is this very love of life that keeps him a bond slave to the twin evils of karma and samsara â samsara that is like a well without water and man the frog that helplessly struggles in it.â
In classical Hinduism, liberation is attained through Moksha â a mystical process by which a soul escapes the endless cycle of birth, death, and rebirth â although what happens to that soul, and what state it attains, varies in the varying classical Hindu texts. In some, it returns to a state of unconscious and indifferent pure existence, âlike a stone.â In others, it returns to a state of pure being, full consciousness, and bliss. In the theistic flavors of Hinduism, the liberated self-soul goes to a heavenly world and basks in the glow of Lord Krishna.
The book turns next to the rejectionist philosophy of classical Buddhism. The fundamental feature of life was Dukkha, or suffering, to the Buddha. âSuffering I teach and the way out of suffering⊠Birth is suffering; decay is suffering; illness is suffering; presence of objects we hate is suffering; separation from objects we love is suffering; not to obtain what we crave is suffering.â And elsewhere: âShame on this thing called birth,â for it brings in its train âdecrepitude, disease, and death.â
In his first sermon The Four Noble Truths, the Buddha taught that 1) life is suffering, 2) it is caused by desire, 3) this cause can be removed, and 4) that the Eight-Fold Path will do the trick, resulting in Nirvana, or the extinction of the flame of desire. The exact nature of Nirvana has been the subject of endless debate since the time of the Buddha. The Buddha himself discouraged speculation about it.
Next, Ramesh turns from ancient religion to the 19th century pessimistic philosophies of Arthur Schopenhauer and Edward von Hartmann. Schopenhauer was the first philosopher who was a professed atheist. In contrast to the theodicies of the age that held that this was âthe best of all possible worlds,â he posited existence as pointless suffering. For Schopenhauer, the driving force behind all existence was the Will, or the will-to-life, which entailed âa struggle for existence within and between the species as well as the reproduction of the species.â The result is âthe perpetuation of pointless misery and suffering; pointless because there is no ultimate aim or goal beyond the maintenance of oneâs own existence and the perpetuation of life through reproduction.â Schopenhauer counseled an extreme ascetic resignation as a path to liberation from the will.
Edward von Hartmann carried Schopenhauerâs philosophy forward. By modifying it with an evolutionary and historical perspective, he overcame certain known logical flaws in Schopenhauerâs work.
Hartmann posited all not as Will, but as Unconscious, which includes both will and reason. In Hartmannâs work, humankind develops historically through three distinct phases of collective delusion. The first delusion is the belief in eudamonia in the here and now, as pursued by the ancient Greeks. When that failed to come to fruition, humankind turned to a new delusion: edaumonia in the hereafter, as sought by the Christians. Lastly, as Christian beliefs were increasingly shown to be false thanks to the progress of science, humankind pursues a third delusion: the belief that technological mastery over the world would lead to human happiness. Hartman argued that these phases would culminate in the loss of all delusion through the triumph of reason over the will and delivery from the evil of existence.
For Hartman, mankind had already entered the third-stage of existence, in which mankind was beginning to see how illusory is the belief that material progress will lead to heaven on earth â for how plain it is that although man has and continues to progress materially, he does not progress morally. âCivilization can only change the form but not the substance of the innate egotism and destructive impulses of mankind.â Keep in mind Hartmann wrote all of this in the latter half of the 19th century â many decades before the dissonance of progress sounded through the explosion of atom bombs.
Lastly, Ramesh turns to twentieth and twenty-first century expressions of rejectionist ideas: from the analytical arguments of David Benatar for anti-natalism (which Iâve previously reviewed), to the existential literature of Jean-Paul Sartre (âNauseaâ) and the rejectionist works of Samuel Beckett (âWaiting for Godotâ, âEndgameâ, âHow it Isâ, âHappy Daysâ, âMolloyâ, etc.). Although the latter examples arenât meant to systematically illuminate rejectionist philosophy, they do nonetheless provide piercing descriptions of the human condition within a rejectionist framework.
The book ends with a Q&A that touches on all the major topics and themes within the book, while also answering certain common objections. In all, this is a solid work of scholarship, and itâs a shame it hasnât received wider readership and notoriety.