This is a collection of academic papers for and against anti-natalism. On the āagainstā side, a number of philosophers (including āThaddeus Metzā) object to various arguments made by David Benatar in his book āBetter Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming Into Existence.ā On the āfor sideā, three philosophers present new or different ethical arguments against procreation than the axiological asymmetry argument Benatar propounds. In the last paper, Benatar replies to everyone, arguing why everyone elseās arguments fail ā both āforā and āagainstā!
The āagainstā responses range from rather glib and flippant objections (including āHooray for Babiesā, āLife is Goodā) to more seriously argued objections (including āAre Lives Worth Creating?ā, āBetter to Beā, āSick and Healthy: Benatar on the Logic of Valueā). The three philosophers presenting new or different āforā arguments for anti-natalism include an argument for prima facie duties, an argument against non-consensual harm infliction, and an argument that centers on both an Epicurean conception of death (as ānot bad for the one who diesā) with a temporally discontinuous concept of self identity.
Reading Benatarās reactions to all of these arguments was both entertaining and impressive. His responses are clear and concise, and both make clear the arguments of the authors he is replying to (something those authors did not always do themselves) while also making clear the faulty premises or logical inconsistencies that their arguments displayed.
I donāt think anything in this volume settles any of these arguments, but itās worth reading if youāre interested in a front-row seat to the intersection of bio-ethics and analytical existentialism.